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Henry of Ghent on Divine Illumination

This essay begins by saying that if one can grasp the first theoretical principles of an object of cognition by natural means alone, without divine illumination, then all resulting objects of cognition can likewise be grasped through natural means. If one can grasp later objects of cognition only after divine illumination of the founding theoretical principles, then one cannot attain them naturally. There are some objects of cognition that are founded on principles that require divine illumination, therefore it is not possible for man to know anything strictly through natural means.

Henry argues that Augustine degrades the value of the human intellect, which is designed to understand things through natural means. God would not give us our intellect if we were incapable of achieving its end. It is man’s nature to have and use rationality. If he cannot use it completely, then he falls short of fulfilling his nature. Since lower species fulfill their natural roles, this would be like saying that humans are more flawed and lower than other animals.

"Therefore it must absolutely be granted that a human being through its soul without any special divine illumination can know or cognize something, and can do so by purely natural means. For to hold the contrary is highly derogatory to the worth of the soul and of human nature."

"...it is clear that we ought to say unconditionally and absolutely that one can know and cognize something through a sensory cognition that is certain, as was shown in the preceding question.” Plus it can be through purely natural means, since that’s what sensory cognition is.

He then makes a distinction between knowing what is true of something and knowing the truth of something:

“So through the intellective cognition of something created, one can have two kinds of cognitions. By one, someone knows or cognizes through a simple understanding solely what a thing is. By the other, someone knows and cognizes the truth of the thing itself, through an understanding that composes and divides.”

The first happens through sensory cognition, the second through an understanding of the ‘form’ of the thing. (He doesn’t use Plato’s term, but it sounds like the same idea). There are three ways of understanding the “being” of a thing: the thing as being one, true, and good.

It is one in that we can differentiate it from everything else. It is true if we can compare it to the model or form of what it is intended to be. It is good if it accomplishes what it is intended to do.

One can understand a thing as being without understanding its truth. The truth of something can only be known through cognizing the conformity of the thing to its “exemplar” (form?).

It is not possible to know the truth of a cognized thing without knowledge of the exemplar. We can know the truth of something if we already know the exemplar and are able to compare the two.

Henry then details why it is impossible for us to have an infallible cognition of truth:

  1. The exemplars we come to cognize are changeable and not eternal, therefore we may be right at one time, but wrong later because of the way of nature. What is eternal is the unnatural -- e.g. mathematics, God.
  2. Even if we focused on the eternal things, the human mind and soul used to cognize eternals is subject to change and error.
  3. We have trouble distinguishing the true object of sensible cognition from its false image since we cognize them together -- we can’t always distinguish the truth of something based on our senses alone because we seem to have difficulty differentiating between the real and unreal within dreams.

John Duns Scotus on Divine Illumination

Scotus criticizes divine illumination as being 1) no more reliable than natural intellection and 2) unnecessary, because there are, in fact, things that we can know to be true without any need for divine light.

Even if we are given divine illumination, our intellection might change, back into error. Scotus also discusses the limitation of instruments -- the idea that, for example, no matter how hard you hit a big boulder with a rolled up newspaper, you won't be able to smash it to pieces, even if you were the strongest man in the world. In the same way, God may try to give us divine illumination in our cognitive process, but even with all that power, our cognitive faculties may simply be too naturally limited to "get it."

Scotus further undercuts Ghent’s defense of divine illumination by suggesting that it is not necessary. Humans are capable of grasping true principles without it in a few particular situations:

  1. Things that are self-evidently true by way of their definitions. We can know that all bachelors are unmarried because that's what a bachelor is, by definition.
  2. We can gain knowledge through experience and observation. All unsupported rocks will fall to the ground. We know this through inductive reasoning.
  3. We have certain knowledge of our acts and mental states and even sensory perceptions. We know for sure these things that are within us because we are actively cognizing them. We may make mistakes in interpretting the causes of sensations, but we know for a fact that we are sensing them. You can know that you hear a ringing in your ear, even if it is not caused by sound waves external to the self -- the perception of hearing the sound is still true.
  4. We can use inductive reasoning with our senses to ascribe to certain objects particular properties. We can say that getting hit in the shin with a basball bat hurts because it has hurt every time it has happened.

Sources

  1. Chapters 12 and 13 from: Klima, G., F. Allhoff, et al. (2007). Medieval Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary, Blackwell Pub.
  2. "John Duns Scotus (1266 - 1308)" The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy